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46. His essay is a fitting one to end a volume 
concerned with upending nationalist historiog-
raphy. Vangelis devoted his scholarship to the 
lives of those Ottoman Greeks who saw their 
future not in the nation, but in a reformed Ot-
toman empire. This is still a controversial topic 
in Greece and his patient reconstruction of the 
lives and thought of Pavlos Carolidis and Em-
manouil Emmanouilidis is a tremendous ex-
cavation of a history that has been buried. As 
with so many others in this volume, Carolidis 
and Emmanouilidis were not committed to the 
nation-state but in the end they found that they 
had to surrender to it. 
This is an excellent volume that should appeal 
to many audiences. Anyone interested in the 
modern Mediterranean, in transnational intel-
lectual history and in the recovery of lost geog-
raphies and forgotten points of view will find it 
very worthwhile indeed. 
George Th. Mavrogordatos
1915: Ο εθνικός διχασμός
[1915: The national schism]
Athens: Patakis, 2015. 343 pp.
Aristides N. Hatzis
University of Athens
The Greek War of Independence started in the 
spring of 1821. By the autumn of 1823, after 
some significant military successes and a dec-
laration of independence, a civil war broke out 
among the revolutionaries. It took a year and a 
half before this self-destructive civil war came 
to an end while the invading Egyptian army of 
Ibrahim Pasha launched a devastating cam-
paign in the Peloponnese.
However, the better known Greek civil war 
is the one that followed Second World War. 
It lasted almost six years, from 1943 to 1949, 
and ended with the defeat of the communist 
guerrillas by a coalition government of con-
servatives and liberals. The impact of this civil 
war is still felt today.
If we study modern Greek history from 1821 
to 2015, we may observe a pattern. Greek so-
ciety and politics tend to extreme polarisation. 
This is not the usual party politics of a liberal 
democracy (Greece has been a liberal democ-
racy since 1864 and a fully fledged one since 
1875). Political polarisation in Greece very of-
ten turns ugly. There are many notorious epi-
sodes of extreme polarisation in Greek history, 
the more recent of them being the referendum 
of 2015. Despite the animosity, intolerance and 
fragmentation, these periods do not include 
widespread violence. They cannot be com-
pared to a civil war.
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According to George Mavrogordatos, professor 
of political science at the University of Athens, 
there is a third (somewhat forgotten) civil war 
in modern Greek history: the so-called National 
Schism. This was a period where extreme po-
larisation led not only to widespread violence 
but also to massacres, political assassinations, 
exiles, political trials and even a temporary se-
cession of a substantial part of the Greek state.
In 1915, King Constantine I quarrelled with the 
prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, over the 
issue of whether Greece should enter the First 
World War or not. Venizelos believed that the 
end of the war would find the Entente victori-
ous. Greece had a moral and political duty to 
help its traditional allies (Britain, France and 
Serbia). There was also a great opportunity for 
the country to profit by seizing territories with 
Greek-speaking populations, such as Thrace, 
Cyprus and the western part of Asia Minor. 
Constantine was the German kaiser’s broth-
er-in-law and an admirer of everything Ger-
man. He did whatever he could to undermine 
Venizelos, by insisting that Greece remain neu-
tral. This led to a major constitutional crisis, a 
blunt disregard for democratic institutions by 
the king and a bold reaction by Venizelos, who 
decided to form another government in the 
northern city of Thessaloniki with the support 
of the French army, which had occupied the re-
gion. Constantine, after tremendous pressure 
from the Entente, decided to retreat by leaving 
Greece. The politically dominant Venizelos of-
ficially entered the war and managed to make 
enormous gains for Greece in the peace con-
ventions. The Greek army landed in Asia Minor 
and eastern Thrace and the Aegean Sea be-
came, literally, a Greek lake. At this moment of 
triumph, he bitterly lost the national elections. 
Royalists brought back Constantine, and con-
tinued the campaign in Asia Minor but without 
the candid support of the dissatisfied allies. The 
emergence of Kemal Atatürk led to a crushing 
defeat and millions of Greek dead or refugees. 
A coup by the defeated Greek military forced 
to Constantine to abdicate and led to a politi-
cal trial, in which the royalist leadership was 
sentenced to death and summarily executed 
in autumn 1922. This was the end of the first 
phase of the so-called National Schism period.
This book was anticipated for many years. 
Mavrogordatos’ doctoral thesis at the Universi-
ty of California, Berkeley, led to the publication 
of Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Par-
ty Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), his much 
acclaimed and award-winning book (Woodrow 
Wilson Foundation Award from the American 
Political Science Association) dealing with the 
second phase of the National Schism. 1915 is 
based on his 40 years of research (another im-
portant milestone was a 1996 book about the 
role that the royalist, protofascist Epistratoi 
corps played in the National Schism period).
1915 is a rewarding book. It is rather slim for 
such a subject and such an ambitious author – 
one could have expected even a multivolume 
treatise. However, the book is so comprehen-
sive, fascinating and well written that I am cer-
tain it will be considered for many years the 
definitive book on the origins of the National 
Schism.
Mavrogordatos divides the book into two sec-
tions. In the first (which takes up almost half of 
the book) he narrates the history of the first pe-
riod of the National Schism (from 1915 to 1922) 
in a way that achieves two ends: a convenient 
introduction for the uninitiated but also a stimu-
lating outline for the expert. In order to help the 
reader, he has also included a useful appendix 
with short biographies of the leading actors.
However, the second part of the book (consist-
ing of four chapters) is the core. After presenting 
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the evidence, Mavrogordatos attempts to ex-
plain and interpret the National Schism. First of 
all, he argues, these events led to a schism be-
cause the two leading antagonists were charis-
matic personalities. He uses Max Weber’s con-
cept of charismatic authority, being very careful 
to define it and, at the same time, reject its triv-
ialisation in everyday (political) language. For 
Mavrogordatos, both leaders were charismatic, 
in their own ways: Venizelos, because he was a 
political genius, and King Constantine, because 
of a combination of factors (ancestry, military 
fame and metaphysical beliefs) that trans-
formed the image of a mediocre, failed and un-
popular prince into the “Son of the Eagle”, the 
Warrior-King. Ironically, Venizelos was instru-
mental for this transformation; almost single-
handedly he created this false image.
The schism was obviously a class conflict. 
Venizelos (and his Liberal Party) was the rep-
resentative of a dynamic rising class of indus-
trialists, shipowners, entrepreneurs and mer-
chants, who believed he was the only politician 
able to expand Greece’s territory and the mar-
ket for their goods and, at the same time, mod-
ernise the Greek state. Venizelos’ opponents 
came mostly from the government-support-
ed (through a clientelist system) part of the 
middle class, the major landowners, the low 
middle class but also labourers. These groups 
were identified by an anticapitalistic mentality, 
fear of competition and risk, a strong antifor-
eign bias and distrust in reform. Farmers, es-
pecially in the territories newly occupied by the 
Greek army, supported Venizelos strongly be-
cause he redistributed the land in their favour. 
However, a great part of them were minorities 
who supported, almost unanimously, his op-
ponents. Venizelos was, after all, the symbol 
of Greek irredentism and their plight.
The National Schism was a crisis of national in-
tegration. From the very beginning, the Greek 
state was an irredentist one. Irredentism was 
the national ideology (Megali Idea or “Great 
Idea”) which stifled almost every other politi-
cal ideology and encumbered normal political 
life for almost a century. When the one-time 
Greece decided (ill-advisedly) to materialise 
the dream of “liberating” areas massively po-
pulated by Greeks in 1897, the result was a 
major defeat and national humiliation.
When Venizelos started to realise this dream, 
he found that Greek society was not prepared 
for it. His political and diplomatic manoeuvres 
were too sophisticated for the narrow-minded 
Greek state. His astonishing success could not 
be dealt with by a conservative population un-
used to risky political and economic ventures. 
The small-time mindset of “Old Greece” (the 
Greek state from 1830 to 1912) was not pre-
pared to do what was necessary to transform 
its nationalistic vision into a political reality, 
that is, to accept the cost of such a grand pro-
ject of territorial expansion and radical mod-
ernisation.
Finally, according to Mavrogordatos, this was 
not a simple political conflict marked by ex-
treme polarisation. This was a genuine civ-
il war. The violence was not only widespread 
and ugly. It was reciprocal and systematic, or-
ganised or tolerated by the leaders of the two 
factions, and protracted. It essentially started 
in 1916 and continued with low or high inten-
sity for two decades. The author dedicates a lot 
of pages to specific incidents. Some of them 
are not well known or totally forgotten (like 
the atrocities in Apeiranthos on the island of 
Naxos). He recreates scenes of horror that are 
reminiscent of similar scenes of the civil war 
of 1943–49. I’m not sure if we should call this 
a civil war as I am not an expert on civil wars. 
However, this does look a lot like a civil war. In 
addition, it left scars like those that only a civil 
war can inflict.
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Is Mavrogordatos impartial? He does his best 
to document the brutalities of both parties (es-
pecially in the last chapter) and he criticises 
Venizelos’ choices quite often, especially his 
zeal in accepting the brutal and humiliating in-
terference of the Entente in Greek politics and 
the essential invasion and bullying by the French 
army. Venizelos is also blamed for his infatua-
tion with Asia Minor and his failure to control the 
thuggish behaviour of his supporters.
The fact is that Venizelos’ superiority, in almost 
every respect, is obvious. He was the reform-
er while his opponents were backward looking. 
He understood the geopolitical stakes while his 
opponents were myopic. He was dependable 
and committed whereas his opponents were 
flimsy and opportunist. He tried to be concilia-
tory but his opponents were vengeful. He was 
not a populist while his opponents invested in 
the basest instincts of their supporters.
Venizelos had many apparent flaws. He shares a 
part of the responsibility for the National Schism 
– one of the reasons being that Greece was not 
ready for Venizelos. As a genuinely charismatic 
leader, he asked for the impossible. The author 
presents the major critiques of Venizelos and 
he uses extensively the private diaries of two of 
his opponents. However, one of them, the most 
capable among the anti-Venizelos crowd, Ioan-
nis Metaxas (who later became a dictator), is 
the only one who, in some instances, manag-
es to distance himself from the rest. In a very 
critical moment, when paranoia had overtaken 
the royalists, he tried to talk some sense into 
them: “Do not destroy Greece in order to destroy 
Venizelos!” Metaxas’ final verdict (which he re-
corded in his diary, two days before his death in 
1941) is characteristic: “We are all responsible 
for 1915. Even Venizelos.”
Since Venizelos has been historically vindicat-
ed, there is a strong hindsight bias in his fa-
vour. A century after the events, it is extremely 
difficult to prevent yourself from being biased 
while treating them with contemporary ana-
lytical and conceptual tools. It was a social and 
political conflict between conservatives and 
liberals. It was an institutional conflict between 
statists and reformers. It was a constitutional 
conflict between the adherents of the Prussian 
model of an authoritarian monarchy and the 
supporters of liberal constitutional democra-
cy. It was even a conflict between feudalism 
and capitalism. Of course, the lines were quite 
blurred, as they always are, and falling into 
Manichaeism is a real danger. Mavrogordatos 
manages to avoid this trap. It is apparent that 
he doesn’t like the royalists (especially since 
many of their actions were evidently treason-
ous) but he is not soft on Venizelos, despite his 
apparent respect and admiration for him.
In conclusion, I must emphasise how much I 
enjoyed this book. I wouldn’t have minded if 
the first chapter was longer. Mavrogordatos, 
who is a first-rate storyteller, concentrates the 
narrative on the schism and leaves some gaps 
that might create confusion in someone who 
lacks the basics. There are also a few instanc-
es where he repeats himself. For some inex-
plicable reason, there is no index.
Mavrogordatos has covered the most critical, 
intense and violent first period of the Nation-
al Schism. But what about the second period 
(1922–36), the period he covered in his disser-
tation (Stillborn Republic)? Since this book has 
not been translated into Greek, I hope that he 
plans to write a second volume on the National 
Schism, the forgotten civil war.
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